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Barry K. Goodwin and Vincent H. Smith 
Recent research has questioned the extent to which government policies, including 
conservation and risk management programs, have influenced environmental 
indicators. The impacts of income-supporting  and risk management programs on soil 
erosion are considered. An econometric model of the determinants of  soil erosion, 
program participation, conservation effort, and input usage is estimated. While the 
Conservation Reserve Program has reduced erosion an average of 1.02 tons per acre 
from 1982 to 1992, approximately half of this reduction has been offset by increased 
erosion resulting from government programs other than federally subsidized crop 
insurance. 
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Introduction 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established under Title XI1 of the Food 
Security Act of 1985 as  a voluntary, long-term cropland retirement program. Participants 
receive an annual rental payment plus 50%  of the cost of planting an  eligible cover crop 
in exchange for removing highly erodible cropland from production for 10 years. The 
1985 law had a goal of enrolling 40-45 million acres by the end of  the 1990 crop year, 
of  which 12.5%  was to be planted in trees. While these goals were not met, nearly 34 
million acres were enrolled in the CRP by the end of  1990. The primary objective of the 
program was to reduce soil erosion, but secondary objectives  included protecting agricul- 
tural productivity, reducing sedimentation, improving water quality and wildlife habitat, 
curbing surplus commodity production, and providing income support to farmers. 
Federal crop insurance and disaster relief programs have a much longer history. A 
systematic federal crop insurance program was first introduced under the provisions of 
the 1938 Crop Insurance Act. From the outset, concerns were expressed about the 
potential land-use effects of the legislation, which initially provided insurance for only 
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a limited number of commodities.  A 1937  Christian  Science Monitor editorial, for example, 
raised the following rhetorical question: 
Will the [crop  insurance] program become in effect an underwriting of high risk 
farming areas which in fact ought to be retired from farming and put to grazing, 
forests, and other uses.. .  ? (quoted in Kramer, p. 184). 
Under the  provisions of the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act and subsequent legisla- 
tion, beginning in 1983,  the federal crop insurance program was substantially expanded 
to cover many more crops in most geographic regions of the United States. Thus the 
potential for the  federal crop insurance program to have an  impact on land-use decisions 
and environmental indicators increased over approximately the same time period in 
which the U.S. government also introduced and expanded the Conservation Reserve 
Program. 
The federal crop insurance program has undergone significant changes in recent 
years. In 1994, the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act brought about major changes to 
the legislation, including a brief period of mandatory participation in the programs (at 
least in order to be eligible for other program benefits). The 1994  Act mandated a pilot 
program to develop cost of production coverage, which, along with innovations by the 
private insurance sector, eventually led to the development of a number of crop revenue 
insurance products. These revenue insurance products have had a major impact on 
insurance participation, now accounting for the largest share of overall crop liability. 
Another major change to crop insurance programs was incorporated into the 2000 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA). This Act substantially increased premium 
subsidies, and thus provided further incentives for participation. ARPA brought about 
a number of other important changes to insurance programs, including expanded 
incentives for research and development.' 
As will be made clear below, our analysis is focused on the period of time in which the 
Conservation Reserve Program was introduced (1982-1992, with CRP beginning in 1985). 
Therefore, we do not consider the effects of these major expansions and changes in crop 
insurance programs, although it  is important to note that crop insurance was expanded 
in the 1980s by the introduction of new county and crop programs under the provisions 
of the 1980 Crop Insurance Reform Act. 
Soil loss is a key environmental indicator. Thus a major objective of this study is to 
obtain quantitative estimates of the effects of the CRP and the federal crop insurance 
program on soil loss. Although a large body of research has considered factors affecting 
CRP enrollment and the potential effects of the expiration of CRP contracts, the aggre- 
gate quantitative effects of the empirical relationships among soil erosion, the Conser- 
vation Reserve Program, crop insurance, disaster relief, and other government programs 
have not been examined. 
This study estimates a model applied to two years (1982 and 1992)  of cross-sectional, 
county-level data encompassing agricultural  production and soil erosion both before and 
after the introduction of the CRP and the rapid expansion of  crop insurance programs 
subsequent to 1983 (Goodwin and Smith 1995). Observed patterns of  soil erosion are 
considered using data collected under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) 
National Resources Inventory (NRI).  Attention is also given to other government 
'  See Goodwin (2001) for a detailed discussion of changes in crop insurance legislation that occurred during  the 1990s. Goodwin and Smith  Program Participation and Soil Erosion: An Ex Post Evaluation  203 
programs that may influence production and observed patterns of soil erosion. To obtain 
quantitative estimates, a five-equation structural model of CRP participation, soil 
erosion, crop insurance participation, conservation, and fertilizer usage is estimated 
using two-stage least squares procedures. 
Soil Erosion, the CRP, Crop Insurance, 
and Other Government Programs 
The highest participation rates in the CRP have been realized in the Great Plains and 
the Mississippi River delta areas. High rates of CRP participation have also been 
realized in the southeastern United States. In contrast, an examination of  soil erosion 
patterns as reported in the NRI indicates the most serious erosion occurred in south- 
western states.  Most soil losses in this region result from wind erosion. Relatively severe 
erosion also occurs along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. Thus, the areas with the 
most serious erosion levels only partially correspond to the areas with the  highest CRP 
enrollment levels. In comparison, in the 1980s  and 1990s,  federal crop insurance program 
participation rates were high in relatively arid Northern Great Plains states  such as  the 
Dakotas and Montana for crops like wheat, and in parts of Texas for crops such as 
cotton. 
Colacicco, Osborn, and Alt highlight several reasons for concern about the productivity 
effects of  soil erosion. They found that large productivity losses occurred on limited 
amounts of land in each of the farm production regions. Their results suggest soil erosion 
increases production variability, and the  detrimental effects of soil losses are  irreversible 
and cumulative in nature. Ribaudo, and Ribaudo et  al. estimated that the CRP has pro- 
vided positive benefits by preserving natural resources. 
In a recent study, Wu evaluated the extent to which new land was brought into 
production as  other land was being removed by enrolling in the CRP. His study examines 
the effects of increased commodity prices resulting from output decreases associated with 
the CRP itself and scale economies. While Wu's analysis did not account for the effects 
of  other government programs such as crop insurance and disaster relief, his results 
established that for each 100 acres enrolled in the CRP, an additional 20 acres of land 
not previously used to raise crops were brought into production. 
Although the goal of reducing soil erosion may be laudable, various aspects of the CRP 
have been subject to substantive criticisms. The bid selection criteria for the CRP have 
been criticized on the grounds they have maximized acreage enrolled and income trans- 
fers to farmers instead of reducing soil erosion. Land must satisfy erodibility criteria to 
be eligible for participation. A bidding scheme was initially employed to enroll eligible 
land within regional bid pools subject to a bid cap. However, the  bids resulting from this 
process were perceived to be too high and the program was amended in subsequent 
years. Currently, one regional rental rate for several different categories of land is offered 
to participating farmers. While this design may reduce program costs, it does not distin- 
guish among tracts of land according to the effects and severity of  erodibility. 
As noted above, concerns have also been raised about crop insurance, disaster relief, 
and other agricultural programs which may have discouraged CRP enrollment and 
encouraged production on erodible land. In particular, price and income support 
programs, provisions for expanding program acreages, and the expansion of yield risk- 
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all been hypothesized to encourage production on erodible land and to discourage CRP 
participation (see, e.g., Griffin;  Keeton, Skees, and Long; and Goodwin and VandeveerX2 
Since 1985, the CRP has been extended and, in successive farm bills, refocused to 
include water quality, wildlife habitat, wetlands, and other environmental concerns. 
However, while land continues to be enrolled (and re-enrolled), the  overwhelming major- 
ity of CRP acreage was initially placed in conserving uses under the 1985 legislation. 
Reichelderfer and Boggess evaluated CRP objectives and simulated a series of imple- 
mentation alternatives. Their results showed the goals of  cost reduction and erosion 
management were to some extent mutually inconsistent, and optimal erosion control 
would be quite costly. Their research was critical of the bid process for selecting parti- 
cipating acres, and  concluded  more cost-effective erosion management would be possible 
if the selection process also considered the level of erosion reduction obtained on 
individual tracts of land. 
A 1990 U.S. General Accounting Office report suggested the offer system was ineffi- 
cient and often resulted in rental rates exceeding the rental value of farmland. Smith 
(1995),  however, argues it  might be difficult to construct an alternative  bid process that 
operates more efficiently. Among the  total acres eligible for the CRP, Sinner asserts all 
but 25% could be farmed effectively with erosion-control cropping practices, and that 
subsidizing these changes would be less costly than retiring cropland from production. 
Finally, in an analysis of landowner incorporation of onsite soil erosion costs and the 
CRP, Miranda notes the regional offer system for CRP rental rates does not recognize 
erosion cost and benefit differences among individual producers. 
A Simple Conceptual Framework 
Soil erosion measured at  the county level is  linked to several important farm-level 
decisions, including choices about the allocation of land among the CRP and crop 
production, conservation efforts, and production practices as also reflected by input use. 
The quantitative linkages among participation in the CRP, the federal crop insurance 
program, other government programs, and soil erosion rates are  the main focus of this 
study. However, while there is no intent here to develop a detailed model of farm-level 
production decisions, the specification of the empirical models presented below is use- 
fully informed by a simple exposition of theoretical considerations. 
Enrollment of land in the  CRP and participation in subsidized federal crop insurance 
and other programs is voluntary.3 Thus, each producer determines whether to partici- 
pate in each program in the context of the farm's overall objective function. Typically, 
in a context in which attitudes toward risk have important effects on choices, and pro- 
duction and program participation decisions have intertemporal consequences,  producers 
are assumed to maximize the expected utility of an appropriately discounted stream of 
profits over time. In the case of  the CRP, the farm's participation decision is clearly 
intertemporal, as CRP contracts require multi-year and multi-harvest commitments of 
Goodwin and Smith (2003)  estimated the effects of crop insurance programs on soil erosion in counties predominantly 
producing corn and soybeans,  and found higher insurance participation increased erosion for corn but decreased erosion for 
soybeans. They suggest this "may reflect the fact that participation and the intensity of production of these crops appears 
to be higher in those parts of the country that experience  higher soil erosion" (Goodwin and Smith 2003,  p. 191). 
Occasionally, as in 1989 and 1995,  participation in crop insurance has been mandatory for producers who participated 
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land resources to a specific use. Insurance program participation decisions are  made on 
a year-to-year basis but, as Vercammen and van Kooten have noted, these decisions 
have dynamic consequences. 
Both the CRP and federal crop insurance programs can also be viewed as tools for 
managing the risk associated with farm income volatility. In this context, the role of 
crop insurance is relatively transparent but, by providing farmers with a guaranteed 
stream of fixed payments, CRP contracts may stabilize farm income streams. Conse- 
quently, it is appropriate to think of participation in both programs as decisions being 
made in an intertemporal, dynamic context in which producers maximize the expected 
utility of  profits. 
Producers can be viewed as producing two types of output that generate revenues: 
crops and land allocated to the CRP. While the allocation of  land to the CRP provides 
producers with a stream of revenues through the contract payments they receive, it  also 
causes them to incur some one-time and some recurring costs, including the estab- 
lishment and maintenance of  appropriate cover. Likewise, crop production generates 
revenues and involves costs. The revenues associated with crop production include 
market receipts (price multiplied by output), government  payments linked to crop 
production (such as payments under the Marketing Loan Program), and indemnities 
resulting from participation in crop insurance programs. Producers also incur costs in 
producing crops, including payments for physical inputs such as seed, fertilizer and 
other chemicals, hired labor, and the use of machinery and equipment-and  crop 
insurance premiums. 
Suppressing time subscripts, the single-period profit function for a representative 
producer producing a single composite crop within a county can be written as: 
where 11 is profit, p is crop price, A is the area planted to the crop (measured in acres), 
Y is the farm's effective yield per acre, g denotes per acre government payments associ- 
ated with crop prod~ction,~  T is total land available for allocation to crop production or 
CRP, r is the CRP per acre payment to the producer, z is a measure of physical input use 
on the farm, c(z)  is the total cost of those inputs,  TI. is the per acre premium rate for crop 
insurance, and A is the level of insurance purchased. 
Actual physical yield depends on the producer's use of  physical inputs (z) and a 
random shock, represented by the variance of yields (a2),  but the farmer may purchase 
insurance (A) to offset physical yield shortfalls. Thus, as  illustrated in (I),  the producer's 
effective crop yield Y is a function of both a2  and A, as well as  z.~  The per acre premium 
rate x(A) is assumed to be an  increasing function of the level of insurance purchased by 
'Areviewer noted government payments were not fixed on a per acre basis in 1982 or 1992.  The structure  of actual govern- 
ment payments depended on the crop. Many payments, for example, were functions of realized crop prices (e.g., deficiency 
payments and subsidies deriving from the Marketing Loan Program). At the county level, therefore, prior to 1996, total 
government payments received depended heavily on crop mix and market prices. From a profit-maximizing perspective in 
making production decisions, what matter are expectations about program benefits. Thus, to indicate the potential importance 
of government programs in output and resource use decisions in (I),  we use a simplified representation of their potential 
effects through the term gA. A more detailed description of U.S. commodity programs and important changes in those 
programs during the period 1972 to 1996 are provided by, among others, Smith and Glauber. 
This specification implies crop insurance indemnities are paid in kind (for example, in bushels of wheat). In  fact, farmers 
receive indemnity payments in dollars, but the representation in (1) is a useful abstraction that captures the intent of crop 
insurance to reduce the volatility of farm incomes. 206  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the producer. The cost function associated with physical inputs, c(z), can be viewed as 
including costs associated with crop production and related conservation compliance 
practices as  well as inputs allocated to maintaining land in the CRP. 
In an intertemporal context, the representative producer will select values for A, z, 
A, and, by implication, T -A to maximize the discounted present value of the expected 
utility of profits over the producer's relevant time horizon. Specifically, the objective 
function is designated by: 
EV  = /os  6'U(IIt) dt, 
where U is the utility function, E is the expectations operator, t denotes time, 0  is the 
current period in which decisions are  being made, 6 is the  representative producer's rate 
of time preference, and S  is the terminal point of the producer's planning horizon. 
In this context, because land is a jointly allocable input, optimization by the  producer 
implies the allocation of land to one enterprise, say the CRP, in any given period will be 
a function of the amount of land allocated to the other enterprise, say crops (see 
Shumway,  Pope, and Nash; Lau;  Lynne), which itself depends on the incentives for 
placing land in that use. Thus, the proportion of total land available for use allocated 
to the CRP depends inversely on expected government payments associated with crop 
production,  participation  in crop insurance programs (which is itself a function of 
premium rates and indemnities linked to government subsidies), and input choices 
which, in the case of fertilizers and other inputs, may also be related to crop insurance 
decisions (Smith and Goodwin; Babcock and Hennessy). Conservation practices, which 
likewise have implications for soil erosion, will also be affected by the mix of  crops 
produced, input use, CRP choices, government  payment^,^ and by the exogenous vari- 
ables affecting those choices. Observed soil erosion rates will therefore be affected by 
CRP participation, conservation efforts, crop insurance participation, and input uses 
which are endogenous choices, as  well as other, exogenous, variables. 
The above theoretical considerations therefore suggest that  an empirical model of the 
effects of participation in the CRP and federally subsidized crop insurance programs on 
soil erosion should account for endogeneity among those three variables and conserva- 
tion efforts. In addition, chemical input choices are endogenous, and the effect of crop 
insurance participation on chemical use has been the subject of  some debate. Thus we 
estimate a simultaneous system of five structural equations using county-level data in 
which soil erosion, CRP participation, participation in federal crop insurance programs, 
conservation effort, and  fertilizer use are  the endogenous  variables. Exogenous  variables 
include measures of  the inherent characteristics of the soil and land class, the mix of 
crops and livestock operations, per acre government payments, yield risk, insurance 
premium rates, CRP rental rates and government cost-sharing, and the extensiveness 
of agriculture within the county. Although the theoretical model is specified in terms of 
individual farm decision making, county-level  data are  utilized to estimate the empirical 
models presented below because of the availability of countywide measures of soil 
erosion and other important variables. 
'Eligibility for government  payments involves cross-compliance  requirements that encourage conservation  practices,  but 
government payments may also reduce pasture in counties throughincreased incentives for crop production. Thus, a priori, 
the effect of government payments on conservation practices is ambiguous. Goodwin and Smith  Program Participation and Soil Erosion: An Ex Post Evaluation  207 
Empirical Application 
County-level data describing soil erosion, soil characteristics, conservation activities, 
and land-use patterns were collected for every U.S. county from the USDA's  National 
Resources Inventory (NRI)  database.' The NRI is a comprehensive survey of land charac- 
teristics, soil erosion, and land usage patterns. The survey was taken in 1982,1987, and 
1992.  Data were collected corresponding to the period preceding the CRP (1982) and the 
period following most CRP  enrollment (1992).  The NRI contains expansion factors 
intended to allow aggregation to the county level. In particular, the sum of  expansion 
factors corresponding to specific land uses must match the 1980 Census county-level 
land-use patterns. The sampling design for constructing the NRI data is discussed in 
detail by Nusser and Goebel. The analysis included 4,115 observations. Crop production 
patterns and crop yields were taken from unpublished USDA/National Agricultural 
Statistics Service (NASS) files. 
Planted acreage yields for the 20 years preceding each observation year (1982 and 
1992) were used to construct average yields and measures of yield risk (coefficients of 
variation) at the county level. Yields were detrended by regressing them on a quadratic 
time trend.8 Costs of  production and revenues from crops, livestock, and government 
payments were collected for each county from the  U.S. Department of Commerce's 
Regional Economic Information System (REIS). CRP participation, program rental and 
cost-share payments, and  disaster paymentsg  were taken from unpublished USDA data. 
Similarly, premium payments and liability statistics for the U.S. federal crop insurance 
program were obtained from unpublished USDA Risk Management Agency data. 
A small number of counties having no agricultural land, almost entirely federally owned, or for which relevant economic 
data were missing were omitted from the analysis. Wu cautions that the accuracy of NFtI soil erosion measures at  the county 
level may be questionable in some cases, and thus argues in  favor of analysis at  the major land resource area (MLRA)  level, 
a multi-county geographic area. However, while there is  possible measurement error in the NFtI variables due to aggregation 
to the county level rather than the MLRA level, aggregating from the county level to the MLRA level also results in the 
potential for measurement error in  other important variables such as crop insurance participation, yields, yield variances, 
and other government program expenditures. Based on these considerations, the county is utilized as  the geographic unit 
of measurement for this study. 
In particular, detrended planted yields for each crop for which NASS collects data in  each county were estimated using 
data  for the period 1961  to 1992. Coefficients ofvariation (CVs)  for each crop in  each county, centered on predicted yield levels 
for 1992, were computed for 1982 using the residuals from the regressions for the preceding 20-year period 1961 to 1981. 
Similarly, CVs for 1992 were estimated using the residuals from the regressions for the preceding 20-year period 1971 to 
1991.  The  centering was accomplished by addingresiduals from each year  back to the predicted value for eachcounty in  1992. 
This adjustment and the use of the yield CV permits comparisons of yield risk in the two different time periods. Note that 
the use of the CV of yields as  a measure of variability makes a scale adjustment for the mean effect. The countywide average 
CVs used in  the regressions (for which results are reported in  table 2) are weighted averages of the CVs for the individual 
crops, where the  weights are  crop shares  of planted acres. Finally, in eachcounty, crops with less than  five yield observations 
for the preceding 20 years were dropped from the analysis. This led to some counties with limited yield data  being dropped 
from the analysis and resulted in  a total of 4,115 usable observations for the  econometric analysis, ofwhich 2,112 are  for 1982, 
and 2,003 for 1992. Thus the same set of counties could not be utilized for each of the two observation years. 
'Because comparable data  for other years were not available, we utilize the county average of real disaster  relief payments 
over the 1985-94 period, as  compiled by the Environmental Working Group from unpublished USDA data, to represent the 
tendency for producers to expect ad hoc disaster assistance receipts in  each county. A long-run average is required because 
of the random nature of disaster payments over time. Ex ante, producers do not know future realizations of disaster pay- 
ments, and it  is  not our intention to attempt to model disaster payments as  such. Rather, we hypothesize that disaster relief 
is largely county specific in nature, reflecting crop production patterns, regional risks, and cross-sectional  differences in 
political support. We use the same disaster payments measure at  the county level for each ofthe two observation years (1982 
and 1992)  because, as  previously noted, the only data available are  for the period 1985-94. Even though policy changes with 
respect to disaster assistance were implemented in principle (the  Crop Insurance  &form Act of 1980  was supposed to remove 
the need for ad hoc disaster relief but was not successful in  its objective), the  variable used here still provides insights about 
regional differences in  the allocation of disaster payments and can be viewed as  an  indicator of expectations with respect to 
such payments in  both 1982 and 1992. 208  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Soil erosion is measured using values from the universal soil loss equations for wind 
and  water erosion. Soil characteristics considered in the analysis included the  universal 
K-factor, a measure of the inherent erodibility of  land, and the T-factor, a measure of 
the tolerance a particular plot of land has for erosion. Conservation applied to an indi- 
vidual plot is  represented by the P-factor, a measure of the degree of conservation effort, 
where higher values indicate lower levels of conservation effort.''  The NRI figures are 
county-level weighted averages of values collected from over one million plots nation- 
wide (an average of more than 3,000 plots per county). The CRP enrollment and payment 
figures included enrollment through 1992. Eligibility for participation in the CRP was 
determined for individual plots using criteria values from the 1987 NRI survey. All 
financial variables were deflated using the producer price index for farm and processed 
food and feed products. Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in 
table 1. 
The model of CRP participation, crop insurance participation, and soil erosion includes 
five equations: CRP participation (as a proportion of total agricultural acres), soil loss, 
crop insurance participation, the  conservation effort, and  fertilizer usage. Modeling 
participation in the CRP is complicated by the fact that no program existed in 1982. 
CRP participation is thus zero in the  first year of the sample (1982),  but is endogenously 
determined with other variables in the second observation year (1992).11  To account for 
this  fact, in the estimation models, CRP participation was specified as  being endogenous 
in 1992, but was exogenously fured to be zero in 1982.  This involved estimating the CRP 
participation reduced-form equation used to obtain instrumental variables only for 1992. 
The five-equation system was estimated using two-stage least squares.12  Parameter esti- 
mates and summary statistics are reported in table 2. 
An  important econometric issue should be acknowledged before proceeding to the 
estimated model. CRP participation is a censored variable. In cases where no enroll- 
ments are observed, participation is censored at zero. This is, of course, only relevant 
in the portion of our data applying to 1992, since the CRP did not exist in 1982, and thus 
participation is exogenously fured to be zero. 
To address the potential for censoring in the CRP equation, a two-stage Tobit type of 
estimator was incorporated. Following the approach of Nelson and Olson, a first-stage 
Tobit model is estimated using all exogenous variables as instruments, and then the 
index implied by the structure of  the model (i.e., the predicted values from the first- 
stage Tobit model) is used as a representation of  the inclination to participate in the 
CRP. As Maddala (p. 198)  has noted, derivation of the correct covariance matrix can be 
complex. Thus, a bootstrapping procedure is  utilized whereby we resample with replace- 
ment from the  estimation data  and calculate measures of the  variability of the  estimates 
by considering the implied bootstrapped covariance terms. The bootstrapping approach 
uses 2,500 replications. Parameter estimates and standard errors are  given by the  mean 
and standard deviations of the 2,500 replicated parameters. 
10 The P-factor represents the conservation  effort on land and is defined as the ratio of soil loss with a given conservation 
practice (surface  condition)  to soil loss under standard  cultivationwithout conservation measures (up-  and downhill plowing). 
An absence  of conservation  measures implies a P-factor of one, while the presence of factors expected to completely eliminate 
soil loss implies a P-factor of zero. Of course, aggregation  to the county level will yield values ranging between zero and one. 
"  An ex post determination  of the effects of the CRP program on erosion  requires observations  in the period preceding the 
program. 
12 Three-stage least squares may offer efficiency gains. However, the covariance structure is complicated by the fact that 
CRP participation is exogenously fixed at zero for the first half of our sample. Goodwin and Smith  Program Participation and Soil Erosion: An  Ex Post Evaluation  209 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Mean 1  (Standard Deviation) 
1982 
1982  1992  and 1992  Variable  Definition 
CRP Participation 
Soil Loss 
Percentage of total agricultural acres enrolled in 
the CRP 





Ratio of insured to total crop acres 
NRI P-factor rating of conservation effort 
Chemical and fertilizer expenditures per crop acre 
CRP rental rate ($lacre) 




Ratio of government payments received to total 
gross farm income 
Universal K-factor (measure of inherent soil 
erodibility) 
T-factor (measure of soil tolerance for erosion) 
Disaster Payments  Ten-year (1985-1994) average disaster payment 
receipts in dollars per crop acre 
Corn  Proportion of county's crop acreage planted in 
corn 
Proportion of county's crop acreage planted in 
soybeans 
Soybeans 
Wheat  Proportion of county's crop acreage planted in 
wheat 





Proportion of county's crop acreage planted in 
grain sorghum 







Ratio of county's agricultural to nonagricultural 
acres 
Proportion of agricultural land in USDA 
productivity classes 1  and 2 
Crop insurance premium rate ($ per hundred 
dollars of liability) 
Acreage-weighted average coefficient of variation 
for crop yields 
Total number of farm acres in county (hundred 
thousand acres) 
Livestock  Ratio of livestock sales to total farm sales 
Note: The total number of observations for the two periods is 4,115, with 1982 = 2,112 and 1992 = 2,003. 2 10  August 2003  Journal ofAgricuItura1  and Resource Economics 
The model specification includes an  interaction term between yield risk and premium 
rates. In the federal program, insurance premium rates are calculated using county- 
level loss histories over the preceding 20 years [see Goodwin (1994)  for a detailed 
discussion of  the federal rate-setting process]. Premium rates may not fully reflect an 
individual producer's risk, and so adverse selection may influence insurance demand. 
Therefore, an interaction term is included between yield risk and premium rates to 
allow for differentiated responses to premiums. Because the analysis is at the county 
level of aggregation, adverse selection arising from differences among producers within 
a county may not be fully captured in our specification. Fertilizer usage is measured as 
real expenditures on fertilizer and agricultural chemicals per crop acre. Fertilizer usage 
is related to insurance participation as well as to a number of variables representing 
crop mix and the agricultural structure of each county. 
The implications of the  parameter estimates (table  2)  are  as  follows. As expected, CRP 
participation, measured as the percentage of  total agricultural acres in each county 
enrolled in the program, is positively related to the CRP rental rate (Rental Rate), and 
the  coefficient is significant at  the 5%  level. In contrast, the  results show CRP participa- 
tion is negatively related to the amount of cost sharing (Cost Share).  The effect, though 
statistically significant, is  very small. The  K-Factor, representing a parcel of land's 
inherent erodibility, is significant and negatively related to participation. However, the 
T-Factor, which represents a land parcel's  tolerance for erosion, is not significantly 
related to participation. This finding indicates participation may be lower in regions 
with land that is more sensitive to erosion. Though this result may appear to be an 
indication the program is not addressing erosion issues in those areas most sensitive to 
erosion, it  may also be related to the  fact that agriculture is  naturally more concentrated 
in areas having more erodible land but also a higher tolerance to erosion. Such areas are 
cropped more intensively, and so the realized soil loss tends to be higher.13 This result 
may also be consistent with claims by critics of  the CRP that participation does not 
necessarily occur in those areas most sensitive to erosion. 
Paradoxically, the results also indicate CRP participation is positively related to over- 
all government payments (Government  Program Payments). This result may reflect the 
influence of  the cross-sectional nature of  the data-i.e.,  government payments were 
relatively large in counties that produced program crops such as  wheat, corn, and soy- 
beans where CRP participation was also substantial. 
The soil loss equation estimates indicate that the CRP has had a significant effect in 
reducing erosion in  those counties where CRP participation has  been high. In  particular, 
they imply that a one-point increase in the percentage of total acres enrolled in  the CRP 
would reduce erosion by an  average of 0.28 tons per acre. However, the results also show 
some other government programs have had offsetting effects. Increases in direct 
government payments (measured as a proportion of  farm revenues) have statistically 
significant and substantial positive effects on soil erosion. Specifically, the coefficient 
for Government Program Payments in the soil loss equation presented in table 2 implies 
that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of revenues generated by direct 
farm program payments would increase soil erosion by 0.135 tons per acre.14 
l3  The Pearson correlation coefficient between soil loss and the T-factor had a value of 0.1915, which was statistically sig- 
nificant. 
l4  An  alternative measure of government payments, the county average of the proportion of revenues provided over the 
preceding 10 years, was also incorporated in  regressions not reported here. Parameter estimates obtained from that model 
were very similar to those reported in  table 2. Goodwin and Smith  Program Participation and Soil Erosion: An Ex  Post Evaluation  2 1 1 
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In contrast, federally subsidized crop insurance programs appear to have little effect on 
soil erosion. While the coefficient on federal crop insurance program participation (CRP 
Participation) is statistically significant, its  sign is  negative. The implied effect, however, 
is small: a 1%  increase in participation in insurance programs would lower soil erosion 
by only 0.02 tons per acre. This finding, which does not show that increased crop insur- 
ance participation increases soil erosion, runs counter to claims by critics of  the crop 
insurance program who assert participation tends to substantially worsen soil erosion. 
Estimating the  joint effects of changes in the average levels of  insurance participation, 
government payments, and CRP participation between 1982 and 1992  permits an  evalu- 
ation of the relative effects of these programs on erosion.15  Essentially, the results 
presented in table 2 establish that participation in crop insurance had only a very modest 
effect on soil erosion (as  noted above, the estimated coefficient is in  fact negative). Other 
government payments are  a different story. Such payments increased from 3.5% to 7.6% 
between 1982 and 1992 (table 1).  Using the parameter estimates reported in table 2, 
this implies erosion was increased by 0.55 tons per acre by other government payment 
programs. The model parameter estimates also indicate that the introduction of the CRP, 
which resulted in a participation rate of 3.64% of cropland acres by 1992, reduced aver- 
age soil erosion by 1.02 tons per acre. These estimates suggest about half of the decrease 
in erosion brought about by participation in the CRP was offset by changes in direct 
government payment programs, while none was offset by increased erosion resulting 
from changes in federal crop insurance. 
The results in table 2 also show disaster aid (Disaster Payments) had no statistically 
significant effect on soil erosion. As with crop insurance  participation, this  finding 
suggests disaster payments are not important determinants of soil erosion.16 
One other variable, the conservation effort index (Conservation  Effort), has a statisti- 
cally significant positive effect on soil erosion. Given that a higher value for the conser- 
vation effort index denotes a lower level of conservation effort, this result indicates soil 
erosion is reduced by increased conservation efforts (i.e., lower values for the index 
imply lower levels of soil erosion). The intensity of agricultural activity in a particular 
county (Agricultural Intensity), measured as the ratio of  the area of agricultural land 
to nonagricultural land within a county, also has a positive effect on observed levels of 
erosion, though this effect is not statistically significant. 
The parameter estimates for the insurance participation equation (table 2) confirm 
several findings previously reported in  the  literature (Goodwin 1993;  Smith and Baquet; 
Smith and Goodwin) that crop insurance participation is negatively affected by insur- 
ance premium rates, but responsiveness to changes in premium rates often declines 
as  yield risk increases.17  Likewise, in accord with results presented by Smith and 
l5 As correctly noted by a referee, one could model the changes in variables between the two years of our study (1982 and 
1992).  Because the Conservation Reserve Rogram did not exist in 1982, a model that evaluates the relevant relationships 
in both periods (with CRP participation exogenously  fixed to be zero in 1982)  was preferred, although differencing  across time 
certainly is a reasonable alternative. 
16 As Goodwin and Smith (1995)  have documented, one intention of the 1980 Federal Crop Insurance Act was to replace 
ad hoc disaster programs with an expanded federal crop insurance program. However, Congress was more than willing to 
supplement crop insurance with disaster aid when the farm sector in any given region experienced  even moderately adverse 
production conditions.  Ironically,  because ofseveralmajor drought years (1985,1986,  and 1988),  federal disaster aid expendi- 
tures may have increased in the 1980s relative to the 1970s. 
"Note that the marginal effect of an increase in premium rates depends on the premium coefficient, the value of the risk 
variable, and the coefficient attached to the risk-premium rate interaction term. This marginal effect, when estimated at  the 
sample mean for the riskvariable, is negative and statistically significant with an estimated value of  -1.056 and a standard 
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Goodwin, the  estimates suggest the  presence of an  important moral hazard effect where- 
by farms with more insurance tend to use less fertilizer and vice versa he., farms that 
apply a substantial amount of fertilizer and chemicals are less likely to insure). In the 
insurance participation equation, the coefficient for fertilizer use (Fertilizer)  is  negative 
and significant, indicating farms with lower per acre fertilizer use are more likely to 
participate in crop insurance programs, a finding similar to those reported by Babcock 
and Hennessy and by Smith and Goodwin. Furthermore, insurance participation has a 
strong negative and statistically significant effect on the use of fertilizer. 
Based on other parameter estimates in the insurance participation equation (table 
21, in counties where agricultural intensity is higher (Agricultural Intensity), the size 
of the agricultural sector is larger (Size, in terms of  area), and a larger proportion of 
land is in higher productivity classes (Land Classification), insurance participation is 
also statistically significantly higher. This is perhaps partly because of  networking 
externalities with respect to information among producers about crop insurance pro- 
grams and economies  of scale in the supply of crop insurance. In counties where disaster 
payments appear to be higher, crop insurance participation is also higher, most likely 
because these are  also counties in which production risks are  generally greater. In addi- 
tion, crop producers who are  more heavily diversified into livestock are less likely to buy 
crop insurance. Clearly, such diversification can lower the  overall revenue risk of a farm 
and thus diminish incentives for buying crop insurance. 
Adoption of conservation measures, as  represented by lower values for the  NRI 
P-factor rating of Conservation Effort, is negatively affected by government payments 
(the coefficient on direct Government Program Payments is positive and significant), 
perhaps reflecting greater incentives for more intensive cropping associated with higher 
levels of income supporting farm programs. Conservation efforts are also affected by a 
county's mix of crops. In particular, relatively lower conservation efforts appear to be 
practiced in counties in which greater proportions of the cropped area are planted to 
sorghum and lower proportions are  planted to soybeans and cotton. Likewise, the omitted 
category of  crops--consisting  of  a broad collection of  all other minor crops-tends  to 
exhibit less intensive application of conservation than is true for soybeans, cotton, and 
corn. Increased conservation efforts (Conservation  Effort) are  also negatively and signifi- 
cantly associated with increased agricultural intensity (Agricultural Intensity),  but are 
positively and significantly affected by an increase in the share of total sales accounted 
for by livestock (Livestock).  The latter result indicates pasture is a more conserving use 
of land than cropping. 
Production practices, reflected in fertilizer and  chemical use patterns  (Fertilizer)  (real 
expenditures per crop acre), are significantly affected by crop mix and, as discussed 
above, are  inversely related to crop insurance participation. Relative to the default 
category consisting of all minor crops (which include commodities such as  tobacco, 
peanuts, potatoes, and fruits and vegetables), corn, soybeans, cotton, wheat, and grain 
sorghum all tend to have lower levels of fertilizer and chemical usage. The results also 
reveal that corn production uses fertilizer and chemicals more intensively than 
soybeans, cotton, wheat, and grain sorghum. In counties with a substantial amount of 
acreage left unplanted (Not Planted  1, expenditures on fertilizer and chemicals for 
planted acres are much greater. This finding may reflect the fact that counties with 
more idle and fallow land are likely to be less productive and require more intensive use 
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The above results have important implications for the realized impacts of the CRP 
and other government programs on soil erosion. The estimates confirm contentions that 
the CRP has significantly reduced soil erosion. In particular, the estimates suggest a 
reduction in annual soil loss by an average of about 1.02 tons per acre as  a result of the 
program. At the same time, however, significant changes in government programs 
involving  direct payments appear to have resulted in substantial increases in soil erosion. 
In particular, increases in the proportion of farm revenues resulting from government 
program payments between 1982 and 1992 were estimated to have increased erosion by 
about 0.55 tons per acre. Nevertheless, in contrast to the findings of  some previous 
studies, changes in  the federally subsidized crop insurance program were found to have 
very small effects on soil loss. 
These results also have important implications for the design of  future farm 
programs, including extensions to the existing Conservation Reserve Program. Critics 
of the CRP have pointed out that participation has not been entirely consistent with 
optimal reductions in erosion. The results of this analysis suggest an  important element 
in  the  effectiveness of conservation programs such as  the CRP is the interaction of other 
programs which may have effects on erosion that often are  not considered. In  particular, 
federal commodity programs intended to enhance the profitability of agricultural 
production will necessarily increase the  profits foregone in participating in the  CRP. To 
the  extent these programs encourage production on erodible land, erosion will increase. 
Effective policy design and the  attainment of soil erosion reduction goals must recognize 
this interdependence of farm programs. 
Conclusions 
This analysis has focused on an  ex post evaluation of the  effects of the  CRP, federal crop 
insurance, and other government programs on soil erosion patterns through the  United 
States. The study confirms the Conservation Reserve Program significantly reduced 
erosion in  areas  where farmers have participated. At the same time, however, the analy- 
sis  reveals that  while federal crop insurance and disaster relief programs appear to have 
had little impact on soil erosion, income supports which have encouraged production 
have had substantial effects. In particular, about half of the reduction in soil erosion 
attributable to CRP enrollment was offset by increased erosion induced by increases in 
income-supporting federal programs. For the most part, policy makers and previous 
research studies have paid only limited attention to interactions  between different farm 
programs affecting soil erosion. Attention to the interaction among policies should be 
considered as  future  farm policies and conservation programs are  contemplated and the 
effects of individual programs are evaluated. 
The conclusions of  our analysis may have important implications for current crop 
insurance and conservation policies. Our results suggest the  Conservation Reserve 
Program has been effective in reducing erosion, despite income-supporting programs 
which tend to encourage production and thus potentially increase erosion. As noted 
above, risk management programs have been considerably expanded in recent years 
through the  introduction of new products and substantially increased premium subsidies. 
Contrary to the concerns of  many, our findings establish that one should not expect 
large (or perhaps even any) measurable increases in erosion as a result of increases in 
federally subsidized insurance participation. Goodwin and Smith  Program Participation and Soil Erosion: An  Ex  Post Evaluation  2 15 
Perhaps of greater concern are the direct price and income supports channeled through 
programs to producers. The 2002 Farm Bill has expanded this degree of support and has 
included counter-cyclical payments intended to formalize much of  the ad hoc disaster 
relief realized in recent years. To the extent that farming practices are influenced by 
such payments, erosion may increase. However, the 2002 legislation also expanded 
Conservation Reserve  Program provisions. Consequently,  increased conservation efforts, 
including increased enrollment in the CRP, may temper any such effects. 
[Received August 2001;Jinal revision received February 2003.1 
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